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Medicaid is currently the third largest federal domestic spending item after Medicare and Social Security and the second largest state spending item after education. Nearly 60 million low-income adults and children benefit from the program and up to 21.3 million additional lowincome adults could eventually gain coverage under Medicaid expansions associated with the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA; Stephens et al. 2013) . 1 Given the large and growing population served by the program, knowing how Medicaid and other public health insurance programs affect the labor supply of recipients and their family members has become increasingly important for understanding the total costs of the program.
Economic theory predicts that cash and in-kind transfer programs generally should reduce labor supply, and extensive empirical research typically has shown that most such programs do indeed have the hypothesized effect. However, the literature on Medicaid's effect on the labor supply of low-income parents is mixed. While initial work finds strong work disincentives (Ellwood and Adams 1990; Moffitt and Wolfe 1992) , later papers find weaker or even positive effects (Yelowitz 1995 We contribute to this literature by providing plausibly causal estimates of the effect of means-tested public insurance coverage on the employment of nonelderly, nondisabled adults without dependent children (childless adults). Researchers have largely been unable to explore the effects of Medicaid eligibility on the labor supply of childless adults, as states have only recently begun extending coverage to this population. A recent paper by Garthwaite et al. (2013) examines eligibility contractions in Tennesse's program (TennCare), which had been available to childless adults until July 2005, and found both large reductions in Medicaid coverage and large increases in employment rates among childless adults in Tennessee following this contraction.
These results are consistent with a 60 percentage point reduction in labor supply stemming from the availability of public insurance. Baicker et al. (2013) In this study, we exploit a recent policy reversal in Wisconsin, during which a major public insurance expansion for adults without dependent children (childless adults) was implemented and, several months later, abruptly frozen. Individuals who applied after the program was frozen were placed on a waitlist. Those on the waitlist would only be allowed to enroll in the program once enrollment dropped below the capped level, which did not occur at any time during our study period. We obtain estimates of the causal effect of Medicaid on the 2 labor supply of childless adults by comparing the labor market outcomes of those who applied prior to the program freeze and received benefits to those who applied after the program freeze and did not receive benefits.
We use two complementary empirical strategies. First, we use a regression discontinuity design that employs the timing of the enrollment suspension and waitlist introduction. Second, we use a propensity score matching difference-in-differences approach that matches plan enrollees with waitlisted applicants on their observable characteristics. While the regression discontinuity design likely has stronger internal validity, the propensity score matching difference-in-differences approach allows us to take advantage of a greater amount of our data.
A particular strength of our study is that we rely on the state's own administrative records rather than on self-reported enrollment, employment, and earnings data. The data for our study are Medicaid enrollment files merged with quarterly unemployment insurance earnings reports from Wisconsin. The Medicaid records allow us to observe all enrolled and waitlisted applicants, including their exact date of application. The unemployment insurance earnings records are from employer reporting to the state and allow us to observe quarterly wages from all employers, changes in employer, and any spells of non-employment lasting more than one quarter. We merge the two administrative data sets using Social Security numbers.
We find that public insurance enrollment reduces the likelihood that an adult in our sample will be employed by 2.4 to 5.9 percentage points in the difference-in-difference models and by 6.1 to 10.6 percentage points in the regression discontinuity models. These effect sizes are similar to magnitudes found in the current literature on the labor supply effects of other types of health insurance programs, and the sign is consistent with both the theoretical and empirical literatures on the effects of cash and transfer programs on labor supply. A potential complication is whether the distribution mechanism itself influences the labor supply decisions of affected participants. If the waitlist participants we use as a control group for Medicaid recipients are themselves constrained by the waitlist because, for example, they believe 2 A stop-gap program with more limited benefits, called the BadgerCare Plus Basic Plan, was promised for waitlisted applicants at the time of the announcement. The Basic Plan was formally announced in January 2010 and coverage was eventually offered to those enrolled on the waitlist effective in July 2010. The state legislature required the Basic Plan to be self-supporting through premiums. Participants in Basic were required to remain eligible for the Core Plan; this meant, among other requirements, their incomes had to remain below the 200 percent FPL threshold. Adverse selection has been a problem for the Basic Plan: enrollment in the program was closed on March 19, 2011, and enrollees saw multiple increases in required premiums over time. According to a state press release), these changes were made because program expenditures had outpaced revenues (Brueck, 2009) . Enrollment in Basic reached a high of 6,013 in April 2011 (reflecting March applicants) and has steadily declined since. they need to remain eligible for the program in order to eventually receive it, this would bias against us finding any effects. If true, a better allocation mechanism would perhaps be a lottery since nonrecipients would immediately know that they would not receive the program and would make their labor supply decisions accordingly. We are unable to answer this question directly.
PROGRAM BACKGROUND
Most of the literature on waiting lists relates to allocation of medical care. Propper (1990 Propper ( , 1995 points out that there are costs to using waiting lists as mechanisms for medical care allocation in the United Kingdom and estimates these costs using contingent valuation. Johannesson, Johansson, and Soderqvist (1998) estimate the demand for private insurance that would reduce waiting times in Sweden. Globerman (1991) discusses the potential for decreases in productivity due to waiting times. None of these studies examine a random allocation mechanism as an alternative choice. Cullis, Jones, and Propper (2000) provide a general treatment of the theoretical and empirical literature on waiting lists for health care services.
THEORY AND RELATED LITERATURE
A standard static labor supply model would predict that income eligibility thresholds for public health insurance likely reduce the incentive to remain in or return to the workforce and, among workers, likely reduce the incentive to increase work hours. The negative effect on labor supply results from the reduced need for private coverage among recipients as well as the possibility that increased earnings would disqualify them from public coverage (the "Medicaid notch").
The existing economics literature portrays a mixed picture of the impact of Medicaid eligibility on the labor supply of low-income parents, the most comparable population available that has been studied. Initial work found strong work disincentives of Medicaid: Ellwood and 6 Adams (1990) and Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) Other types of cash and in-kind transfer programs in the United States have been found to negatively affect labor supply. Moffitt (2002) reviews the extensive empirical literature. More recently, Jacob and Ludwig (2012) find a 6 percent decline in labor force participation and a 10 percent decrease in earnings resulting from housing vouchers. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) find reductions in employment and hours worked among single-headed households resulting from the Food Stamp program. Meyer (2002) finds that the Earned Income Tax Credit discourages work on the extensive but not on the intensive margin; Eissa and Hoynes (2004) confirm the finding of extensive margin work disincentives at the family level. Social Security Disability Insurance has generally been found to reduce employment among older men (Bound 7 1989; Parsons 1990; Gruber and Kubik 1997; Chen and Van der Klaauw 2008; Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2013; French and Song 2012) .
The effect of public insurance on earnings is ambiguous in our context. If availability of public insurance leads to increased job mobility and increased mobility results in better job matches, we could, all else equal, observe higher wages (and therefore earnings) among the public insurance enrollees. A second possibility is that workers could match with jobs that pay higher wages since the job would no longer need to pay health benefits. Baicker and Chandra (2006) find that increases in health insurance premiums result in both a decreased probability of employment and lower wages, supporting a partial wage offset for health insurance. Since we do not observe hours worked, only quarterly earnings, in practice earnings could either increase (because of better matches and/or wage offsets) or decrease (because of fewer hours worked).
Again, since workers must remain below the income eligibility threshold the positive effects are likely limited.
Finally, increased availability of public insurance may increase the likelihood that a worker would leave the labor force to become self-employed. Consistent with a compensating differential framework, the self-employment wage is effectively increased by the value of public insurance coverage. Results from the empirical literature are mixed (Lombard 2001; HoltzEakin, Penrod, and Rosen 1996; Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2007; Fairlie, Kapur, and Gates 2011) ; however, we acknowledge the possibility and discuss it further below.
DATA
The data sources for this project are state administrative records on enrolled and waitlisted Core Plan applicants and earnings records from Wisconsin's unemployment insurance 8 (UI) system. In the state's records on Core Plan enrollees and waitlisted applicants, we observe exact application date, age in months, monthly income at the time of application, county of residence, and sex. The UI data include quarterly earnings for each individual from each covered firm where he or she worked during that quarter; only employers not subject to unemployment insurance laws (for example, the self-employed) are exempt from the reporting requirement. We observe these data for each person from the first quarter of 2005 (Q1 2005) through the final quarter of 2011 (Q4 2011). We merge the data on Core Plan applicants and enrollees to the UI data using Social Security numbers.
A particular strength of our analysis is that UI data exhibit superior accuracy over the survey-based data used in the existing literature. Virtually all employers are required to file quarterly wage reports for each employee on their payrolls. The wage reports include the employee's Social Security number and quarterly wages and the employer's federal tax identification number and industry classification code. Using these data, we can track quarterly earnings and employment at all covered firms, job changes, and any periods of non-employment lasting for at least one quarter.
Waitlist members were subject to basic screening, but to ensure comparability we employ several sample filters to ensure those on the waitlist would have actually been eligible for Core had they been invited to enroll (on the basis of all characteristics other than earnings, which may have changed in response to being on the waitlist). First, we drop anyone not in the eligibility age range (ages 19-64) according to date of birth. Second, we observe termination codes (reasons) for waitlist members that are removed from the waitlist, and we drop all waitlist members with codes indicating that they either do not meet program requirements or they are 9 eligible for other Medicaid programs. We do not observe Core Plan applicants who applied before the program cutoff and were found ineligible by the state. We consider several outcomes to measure labor supply using the quarterly employment records available in the UI data. For employment, we consider average quarterly employment over the Q4 2009 to Q4 2011 period, with employment defined as having any earnings in a quarter. Earnings are defined as average earnings over Q4 2009 to Q4 2011. For the differencein-differences models, these outcomes are defined analogously for the pre-program period.
Finally, in order to assess the potential for our results to be explained by transitions to self-employment, which would not be recorded in our administrative data, we use the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2009 to 2011.We chose the ACS for its relatively large state sample sizes. The ACS includes a question asking participants whether they were employed by a government, private company, nonprofit organization, or were self-employed. We classify all respondents who indicated that they were self-employed (whether at an incorporated or unincorporated business) as self-employed.
EMPIRICAL METHOD
We identify the effect of the Core Plan on the labor supply of childless adults using two complementary sets of analyses, each with its own relative strengths. The first is regression discontinuity (Lee and Lemieux 2010 ) and the second is propensity score difference-indifferences (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997) . Each empirical strategy relies on a slightly different assumption about the comparability of the waitlist applicants versus the enrolled applicants. If there were no differences between waitlist applicants and enrolled applicants, both approaches would be equally valid. While the regression discontinuity design likely exhibits superior internal validity relative to matching methods, the latter design is relatively better powered. We think the ability to assess the robustness of the results across these two methods provides more convincing evidence than implementing either approach on its own.
We first use a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Lee and Lemieux (2010) provide an overview and summary of recent applications. In essence, this approach involves comparing the labor supply of those who applied just prior to October 9, 2009 (immediately before the enrollment cap was implemented) with the labor supply of those who applied just after October 9, 2009 (immediately after the enrollment cap was set). As discussed above, eligible applicants who applied prior to October 9 were enrolled in the program while those who applied after October 9 were placed on a waiting list. Because all eligible people who applied before October the data on enrollees up to the announcement date, but we estimate and report specifications including applications between October 5 and 9 as well.
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The RD approach enjoys a distinct advantage over simple comparisons of those enrolled in the Core Plan with those on the waiting list. Since the cutoff date was imposed arbitrarily by the state (and was not an original feature of the program), it is reasonable to assume the individuals applying just before the announced cutoff date were very similar to those applying just after the cutoff date. The standard RD identification assumption applies, and in this context is interpreted as: there is no self-selection into application based on the knowledge the applicant will be on the waitlist rather than gain immediate insurance. We implement our estimates using a local linear regression approach. We include robustness checks to various bandwidths as part of our analysis. The standard validity checks are included in the Appendix.
The exact specification of our RD estimator is:
with triangular kernel weights, where all observations outside the bandwidth h (more than ℎ away from 0 ) are discarded. Here, is the outcome under consideration, is the date of application, 0 is the cutoff date, is an indicator for whether or not the individual was enrolled in Medicaid (equals one if on the waitlist, zero if in Core), and is a random error term.
The treatment effect of interest is . The coefficients and allow the slope of the regression to differ on either side of the cutoff 0 .
A disadvantage of RD is that it does not use the entire samples of those on the Core Plan and on the waitlist, so lack of sample size could lead to power issues (though this concern does not appear to be an issue in our case) and limit our ability to conduct sub-analyses that further stratify by age or sex of the applicant. A second issue is that the announcement prior to the actual application cutoff date makes the identification less straightforward than might be desired.
Specifically, we might be concerned that the announcement is a form of manipulation and affects waitlisted applicants in the post period in addition to those who enrolled during the few days between the announcement and the suspension of enrollment.
For these reasons we complement our regression discontinuity design by including a second approach, the use of difference-in-differences and propensity score weighted differencein-differences methods. This design involves making the Core group and waiting list groups as comparable as possible based on observable characteristics, and it takes advantage of the panel nature of the earnings data. In contrast to the regression discontinuity analysis, propensity score weighting uses the entire samples of waitlisted and enrolled applicants. The most important difference with propensity score weighting relative to the discontinuity approach is the assumption required for identification: we must assume that conditional on observables included in the propensity score and an individual fixed effect, there was no selection on time-varying characteristics in the date of application (Smith and Todd 2005 2005] ). A key finding from this body of work is that the underlying assumptions of propensity score methods are best met by including data on lagged labor market outcomes; indeed, lagged labor market measures have been found to be the single most important set of matching variables. We have access to historical UI data, which we use to construct such measures for the study sample. Moreover, our data meet the other key conditions established in the aforementioned methodological literature: matched treatments and controls are drawn from the same geographical labor market and their respective labor market outcomes are measured in the same way (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Heckmanet al. 1996) . 4 We implement both standard difference-in-differences with a variety of specifications, as well as propensity score matched versions of these models. In particular, we estimate the following model:
where Y it is an indicator for positive employment or total earnings for individual i in quarter t, We then construct a propensity score weight for each control observation (waitlisted applicants) using an Epanechnikov kernel weight (Leuven and Sianesi 2003) . The results of the propensity score models and the balancing tests are reported in the appendix.
Finally, we also embed our regression discontinuity framework within the propensity score approach and estimate these models restricting the sample to applications within 30 days of the cutoff date.
RESULTS
In this section, we present the results from the regression discontinuity analysis and those from the propensity score differences-in-differences analysis. Overall, both sets of analyses yield similar estimates despite being identified from different sets of assumptions. Results of the estimation are summarized in Table 2 . Most specifications show a statistically significant and relatively large drop in employment among Core Plan enrollees relative to waitlisted applicants, from 6.9 percentage points in the specification including all applications to 11.8 percentage points in the specification excluding one week around the cutoff and 5.9 percentage points in the specification excluding just the surge of applications between the announcement and the cutoff date. The results in Table 2 are all reported at a bandwidth of 20 days. While the 5.9 percentage point result is not statistically significant at the bandwidth in Table 2 , it remains stable and becomes statistically significant at slightly higher bandwidths. In addition to quarterly measures of employment, Table 2 also includes specifications that aggregate the results to an indicator for ever being employed in 2010. Results and conclusions are very similar.
Probability of Employment
We include standard validity checks in Appendix A. These include a density test ( Figure   A .1) placebo tests (Table A. 3 and A.4), and covariate tests (Table A.1). All placebo and covariate tests are consistent with the regression discontinuity assumption with one exception: a small but statistically significant drop in age of applicants at the time of the cutoff of slightly over three years. However, including age as a covariate makes no difference in the results. the pre period, resulting in a Monday bump. Therefore, we also estimate models defined by application week (Saturday-Friday) rather than day. We find no difference in the size or significance of results using these specifications. We also estimated all specifications controlling for the day of week of the application and found no differences in the results. These results are available upon request. The second two plots also show that the Core Plan enrollees and the waitlisted applicants who applied within one month of October 9 look relatively more similar in terms of their employment rates in the "pre" period, but in the "post" period the waitlisted applicants still show a substantially higher rate of employment. Table 3 reports the results from our difference-in-differences models. The models based on Equation (2) The results indicate a relative decline in average employment rates of 5.9 percentage points for those with public insurance; these results are statistically significant and are robust to including controls for sex, age, and county of residence. When we restrict the sample to those who applied in September and October 2009, the estimated relative reduction in employment rates remains economically large-5.0 percentage points-and statistically significant.
When we estimate the same models using our propensity score weighted sample, we find smaller estimates when the comparison is relative average employment rates between the "pre"
and "post" periods (between 2.4 and 3.3 percentage points) that also are statistically significant.
Earnings
A negative earnings effect across the sample would be expected if wage rates remained the same and Medicaid enrollees were less likely to work. Figure 3 shows local linear regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of public insurance participation on quarterly earnings. The dependent variable is the average total quarterly wage and salary earnings from Q4 2009 to Q4 2011. A summary of these results is included in the second row of Table 2 . In these specifications, waitlist participants earn more than Medicaid enrollees; the results suggest a negative earnings effect of Medicaid of between $200 and $400 per quarter. Table 2 also includes an annual measure, total annual earnings in 2010. The results for annual earnings are very similar, suggesting an annual difference of $950-$1,460, depending on the specification. When we estimate the same models using our propensity score weighted sample, we find a slightly different pattern. In the full sample, the results suggest a positive earnings effect of around $70, while in the restricted sample they suggest a negative earnings effect of $120. These effects are statistically significant in both samples. relative to those on the waitlist). This is consistent with an early retirement story for older workers who may have found it more difficult to obtain a new job.
Subgroups
Point estimates for those who were not employed in the second quarter of 2009 are 2.4
percentage points larger than for those who were employed in the second quarter of 2009. The effect also is substantially larger for people living in counties with low rather than high unemployment rates (split at 10 percent, the 75th percentile unemployment rate weighted by individual). In counties with unemployment rates of 10 percent or less, we find a reduction of employment of 6.8 percentage points of Core enrollees relative to waitlisted applicants. By contrast, the estimate in counties with unemployment rates greater than 10 percent is very small (0.7 percentage points) and statistically insignificant.
Self-Employment
If some Core Plan participants are leaving wage and salary work for self-employment as a result of receiving public insurance, we would classify them as unemployed in our data. This would bias our results toward finding negative labor supply effects when none exist. As discussed earlier, results from the literature on the empirical relationship between health insurance portability and self-employment are mixed; however, given that it is a concern for us, we wanted to test for the possibility. 
CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine the labor supply effects of publicly provided health insurance for low-income adults without dependent children. Our findings suggest that public insurance has a disincentive effect on the labor supply of low-income childless adults. The sizes of our estimated effects are large, ranging from 2.4 to 5.9 percentage points in the difference-indifferences models and from 6.1 to 10.6 percentage points in the regression discontinuity models.
Among a population in which only approximately half of enrollees had any positive earnings in the quarter prior to application, these are meaningful effects. Our evidence suggests that the net effect on earnings (including those who lost or changed jobs) was a reduction of $100-$300 per quarter.
There are several caveats to our results. First, while we find negative employment effects using two different and complementary methods relying on different identifying assumptions and across a variety of specifications, our identification strategies are imperfect. For example, even when we adjust for observable differences between the Core Plan enrollees and the waitlisted applicants using the rich earnings and employment histories available in the UI data and employing difference-in-differences (which nets out any fixed unobserved differences), it does not preclude the existence of time-varying unobserved differences between the two samples.
Moreover, we do find differences at the cutoff discontinuity in the age of the applicants between those waitlisted and those enrolled, which may indicate a violation of the strict RD identifying 21 assumptions. While these age differences are small and the estimated effects change little when we control for age in the RD models, the concern remains. Second, extrapolating from the Wisconsin Core Plan for childless adults to an expansion of Medicaid to childless adults may not be possible. The two programs differ in an important way: Medicaid is an entitlement while the Core Plan is not. Since new enrollment into the Core Plan was ended on October 9, 2009, any Core Plan member who left the plan (perhaps as a result of gaining health insurance through a new employer), would not be able to go back on the plan should he or she subsequently lose private insurance. This would not be the case with Medicaid;
individuals would be free to exit and reenter the program as their eligibility changes. The fact that the Core Plan is not an entitlement could have had a "lock-in" effect on enrollees, exacerbating any employment disincentive relative to Medicaid. On the other hand, the waitlist itself may have provided a disincentive and waitlisted applicants had access to the Basic Plan.
Although only a small percentage of them took up Basic, its existence would provide a work disincentive as well, and minimize the estimated employment disincentive of public insurance.
Finally, as with other studies utilizing unemployment insurance records, we do not observe transitions into and out of self-employment. As we cannot differentiate between selfemployment and being out of the labor force, we could be overstating the association between public insurance eligibility and labor market attachment. Using auxiliary data from the ACS, we explore trends in self-employment among the target population of interest over the study period in order to deduce the potential magnitude and direction of any resulting bias from mislabeling.
We find no evidence of important bias from our inability to identify self-employed members of our sample.
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Our estimates of the labor supply disincentive of public insurance are slightly larger than those found by Baicker et al. (2013) in Oregon and substantially smaller than those found by Garthwaite et al. (2013) in Tennessee. One possible explanation for the variation in estimates is an interaction between the programs and the business cycle. Our findings suggest that almost all of the labor supply response came from individuals living in counties with relatively low unemployment rates and that the labor supply response was greater among individuals who had been working in Q2 of 2009 (a little more than a year prior to their application to the Core plan).
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Waitlist Core Figure 1 . Bandwidths defined as distance from October 9 in "All Dates" or distance from excluded interval in other specifications. *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Covariates include age, sex, day of week of application, and earnings and employment in the second quarter of 2009 Table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of not getting the Core Plan, with robust standard error in italics. All results calculated at bandwidth of 20 days, for specification excluding Oct. 5-Oct. 14. *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level.
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Appendix Figure Table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of not getting the Core Plan on pretreatment covariates, with robust standard error in italics. *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of not getting the Core Plan on pre−treatment covariates, with robust standard error in italics. *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. All estimates at bandwidth of 20 days. 
